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CONSTITUTIONAL HARDBALL 
MARK TuSHNET* 
I. INTRODUCTION: THE CONCEPT OF CONSTITUTIONAL HARDBALL, 
WITH SOME EXAMPLES 
For the past several years I have been noticing a phenomenon 
that seems to me new in my lifetime as a scholar of constitutional 
law. I call the phenomenon constitutional hardball. This Essay 
develops the idea that there is such a practice, that there is a 
sense in which it is new, and that its emergence (or re-emergence) 
is interesting because it signals that political actors understand 
that they are in a position to put in place a new set of deep 
institutional arrangements of a sort I call a constitutional order. l 
A shorthand sketch of constitutional hardball is this: it consists of 
political claims and practices-legislative and executive 
initiatives-that are without much question within the bounds of 
existing constitutional doctrine and practice but that are 
nonetheless in some tension with existing pre-constitutional 
understandings.2 It is hardball because its practitioners see 
themselves as playing for keeps in a special kind of way; they 
believe the stakes of the political controversy their actions provoke 
are quite high, and that their defeat and their opponents' victory 
would be a serious, perhaps permanent setback to the political 
positions they hold.3 
The Essay begins in this Part with some examples of 
constitutional hardball, followed by a description of the practice in 
• Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Constitutional Law, Georgetown 
University Law Center. 
1. For my discussion of the idea of a constitutional order, on which the 
analysis in this Essay builds, see MARK TuSHNET, THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL 
ORDER (2003). 
2. By this I mean the "go without saying" assumptions that underpin 
working systems of constitutional government. They are hard to identify 
outside of times of crisis precisely because they go without saying. (An 
alternative term would be conventions.) These assumptions are conceptually 
prior to the Constitution (thus, "pre"-constitutional), not necessarily 
temporally prior. 
3. For a parallel investigation, dealing however with situations in which 
the stakes are quite substantially higher than they have been in the United 
States, see Jose Maria Maravall, The Rule of Law as a Political Weapon, in 
DEMOCRACY AND THE RULE OF LAW 261 (Jose Maria Maravall & Adam 
Przeworski eds., 2003). 
523 
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more general terms. Part II develops the connection, asserted in 
this Part, between constitutional hardball and changes in 
fundamental constitutional arrangements or, in my own terms, 
constitutional orders. Part III then describes the events 
surrounding Marbury u. Madison as an episode of constitutional 
hardball. Part IV offers further elaborations of the concept, 
emphasizing in particular the ways in which constitutional 
hardball can fail and defending the concept against the charge 
that it does not in fact single out a practice that is different from 
ordinary constitutional politics. Finally, Part V provides some 
modest normative reflections on constitutional hardball. 
A. Some Examples of Constitutional Hardball 
Examples of constitutional hardball may give readers a better 
sense ofthe practices I have in mind.4 Perhaps the best example is 
the filibuster mounted by the Senate's Democrats against several 
judicial nominations made by President George W. Bush in 2002-
03.5 The Democrats' actions were clearly within the bounds set by 
the Senate's rules, and the Constitution expressly authorizes the 
Senate to adopt rules to govern its operation.6 Republicans 
responded to the filibuster by developing an argument that it was 
unconstitutional because it interfered with the ability of the 
Senate to decide, by majority vote, whether to consent to a 
4. I note at the outset that I approach the materials from a partisan 
stance on the left. I believe that my political position makes me more attuned 
to examples of hardball practices I see on the right. The structure of my 
argument, though, strongly suggests that when one side starts to play 
constitutional hardball, the other side will join in. So, I am confident that 
someone who looked at contemporary politics from the right would be able to 
locate examples of constitutional hardball being played by liberals and 
progressives. There is a sense in which my argument suggests that 
conservatives must have started the contemporary game of constitutional 
hardball, although I suspect that it would be quite difficult to identify the first 
instance of constitutional hardball, and I refrain from trying. For the same 
reason I have avoided another possible approach to identifying constitutional 
hardball, suggested to me by Vicki Jackson. Her thought is that constitutional 
hardball originates in a sense of unfairness: people who thought they had been 
playing by the rules discover that their opponents have changed tactics in 
ways that put them at a disadvantage. They then adopt a tit-for-tat strategy 
of retaliation. The difficulty with this approach is that it turns crucially on 
identifying the first departure from prior understandings. Once constitutional 
hardball begins, participants-and observers who will have their own partisan 
predispositions-will disagree over that identification for precisely the same 
reasons that they engage in constitutional hardball. 
5. The example is better than others precisely because it has a bipartisan 
character: The actions on both sides of the Senate's aisle have the key 
attributes of constitutional hardball. 
6. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2. "Each House may determine the Rules of 
its Proceedings". [d. 
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nomination. I believe that argument to be strained,7 because it 
requires one to distinguish between filibusters of judicial 
nominations and filibusters of ordinary legislation recommended 
by the President to Congress pursuant to his duty to do SO.8 Still, 
there are not-implausible distinctions available,9 and some 
versions of arguments against the constitutionality of a Senate 
rule authorizing filibusters generally are not at all insubstantial.10 
The Republicans' arguments, then, were within constitutional 
bounds as well. 
At the same time, some aspects of the Democrats' and the 
Republicans' behavior were unusual. The Democratic filibusters 
were, if not unique/1 quite unusual. We might compare the 
nomination filibuster to recess appointments to the federal courts. 
The Constitution clearly authorizes such appointments,12 and 
presidential use of the power was not unusual. 13 But, presidents 
have come to refrain from using their undoubtedly constitutional 
power to make recess appointments, in part out of concern about 
possible intrusions on judicial independence that arise from the 
possibility that a recess nominee will not receive a permanent 
7. It is developed in Judicial Nominations, Filibusters, and the 
Constitution: When a Majority is Denied its Right to Consent: Before the Senate 
Judiciary Subcommittee on the Constitution, 2003 [hereinafter Eastman's 
Testimony] (statement of John C. Eastman, Professor of Constitutional Law, 
Chapman University School of Law, and Director, The Claremont Institute 
Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence available at http://www.clare 
mont.org/static/pdf/eastmantestimony.pdfOast visited September 3,2003». 
8. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. "He shall from time to time .... recommend to 
their Consideration such Measures as he shall judge necessary and 
expedient". Id. (emphasis added). 
9. For example, as Professor Eastman's testimony, supra note 8, suggests, 
the President's power to nominate judges implicates a different, and perhaps 
more important, set of separation-of-powers concerns than does the power to 
recommend legislation. 
10. For an overview, see Erwin Chemerinsky & Catherine Fisk, The 
Filibuster, 49 STAN. L. REV. 181 (1997). The strongest arguments are against 
using a rule authorizing filibusters to insulate that very rule from change by a 
majority of the Senate. 
11. Republicans had mounted a filibuster when Lyndon Johnson nominated 
Associate Justice Abe Fortas to succeed Earl Warren as Chief Justice. For a 
description, see LAURA KALMAN, ABE FORTAS 355 (1990). Professor Eastman's 
testimony asserts that the Democratic filibusters are "even more problematic 
than the one successfully waged against Fortas, because Fortas never received 
majority support on a cloture vote." Eastman's testimony, supra note 8, at 23 
n.36. According to Kalman, "When [Senate majority leader] Mansfield called 
for a vote on October 1, only forty-five of the eighty-eight Senators present 
. voted for cloture." KALMAN, supra at 355. 
12. U.s. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3. "The President shall have Power to fill up 
all Vacancies that may happen during the Recess of the Senate." Id. 
13. For a discussion, see Louis Fisher, Recess Appointments of Federal 
Judges, CONGo RESEARCH SERVo (Sept. 5, 2001), available at http://www.sen 
ate.gov/referenceiresourceslpdflRL31112.pdfOast visited Nov. 14,2003). 
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position unless he or she curries favor with the president.14 This 
restraint on the use of acknowledged power might even amount to 
a weak pre-constitutional convention against recess appointments 
to the courts. Similarly, one might say, that the Senate had 
adopted a pre-constitutional convention against using the 
filibuster on judicial nominations since the Fortas nomination. 
The Democrats' filibuster is then a repudiation of a settled pre-
constitutional understanding. 
The Republican response is similar, though on a lower level. 
Some Republicans suggested that were the filibusters to persist 
they would support litigation aimed at establishing the 
unconstitutionality of the practice. 15 What was unusual about this 
threat is that Senators typically have been quite jealous about 
refraining from submitting intra-house disputes to judicial 
supervIsIOn. The Senate leadership has often filed papers 
asserting that individual Senators lack standing to challenge 
Senate procedures, for example. The preferred course-perhaps, 
again, amounting to a pre-constitutional convention-is for the 
Senate to resolve these internal disputes internally.1s 
I believe that constitutional hardball is more prevalent than a 
single example indicates. The successful effort in Colorado, and 
the parallel one in Texas, to revisit districting decisions made after 
the 2000 census is similar in structure. Legislatures have an 
undoubted right to alter district lines as often as they want. The 
case for doing so in Colorado and Texas was not frivolous; in each 
state the first set of districts was devised not by an elected 
legislature but by a court acting after the state legislature had 
failed to act. 17 Still, in each round of districting since the 1970s 
14. The practice of recess appointments to Article III courts was suspended 
for about twenty years, then was revived by President Jimmy Carter in 1980 
(a recess appointment of a district judge, whose name was not resubmitted 
when the appointment expired), and, after another twenty-year period, by 
President William Clinton in 2000 (a recess appointment of Roger Gregory, 
who was subsequently renominated by President George W. Bush and 
confirmed by the Senate). [d. at 19-24. 
15. For a copy of the complaint that was filed by Judicial Watch, see 
http://www.judicialwatch.orgicomplaint_051403.shtml (last visited Nov. 12, 
2003). 
16. The Republicans' threat to support litigation was a milder "repudiation" 
of the pre-constitutional understanding than the Democrats' filibuster because 
it was-at least to the present-only a threat. President Bush's recess 
appointment of the filibustered nominee Charles Pickering would seem to be 
stronger repudiation of the possible (weak) pre-constitutional understanding 
limiting the use of recess appointment. 
17. For Colorado, see T.R. Reid, Texans Back Colorado Democrats in 
Redistricting Case, THE WASH. POST, Sept. 9, 2003, at A2. "The state 
legislature, divided between the two parties, could not settle on a new district 
plan in time for the 2002 election, so a state court drew the map." [d. For 
Texas, see Chris Cilizza, Redistricting Two-Step to Resume Monday, ROLL 
CALL, Sept. 11,2003. "Mter Texas legislators deadlocked in their attempts to 
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legislators have generally taken the first set of districts to be fixed 
until the next census or until they were ordered to draw a new set 
of districts by a court. The Republican actions in Colorado and 
Texas are constitutional hardball because they are inconsistent 
with what seemed to be a settled pre-constitutional 
understanding.1s The Democrats' response in Texas-absenting 
themselves from the legislature and the state-was a defensive 
form of constitutional hardball, inconsistent with what most 
people would think were the obligations of elected 
t t · 19 represen a Ives. 
A final example is the impeachment of President Clinton.2o 
Here too there was at least substantial constitutional support for 
the proposition that the House of Representatives had the power 
to impeach Clinton for what its members concluded he had done.21 
Of course, impeachment, particularly of a president, is serious 
business. Prior to the Clinton impeachment, House members filed 
papers aimed at instituting impeachment proceedings of other 
redraw the lines in 2001, a federal court adopted a plan that upheld the status 
quo in the 2002 elections." [d. 
18. Supplementing the hardball of the districting efforts themselves is the 
suggestion by Representative Tom DeLay that the failure to enact new district 
lines is itself a constitutional violation, of the asserted constitutional 
requirement that district lines be drawn by legislatures whenever possible. 
For DeLay's statement, see Fox News Sunday, (Fox television broadcast, Aug. 
17, 2003) stating "We're supposed to, by Constitution, apportion or redistrict 
every 10 years." [d. 
19. Although I would qualify this a bit by noting that the obligations of 
representatives arise out of a duty to constituents to consider the range of 
issues that legislatures deal with, whereas the Democrats left the state to 
avoid sitting in a special legislative session dealing only with the issue of 
apportionment. 
20. Robert Reich uses the examples of impeachment, some aspects of the 
2000 Florida election controversy, and the California recall election to support 
his argument that the United States has begun to experience what he calls a 
permanent election (as distinguished from a permanent election campaign), in 
which the outcomes reached on Election Day are not taken to settle the 
election itself. Robert B. Reich, The Permanent Election, THE AMERICAN 
PROSPECT, Sept. 1, 2003 available at http://www.prospect.org 
/printIVl4/8/reich-r.html (last visited Nov. 14,2003). Reich's idea is similar to 
mine, but it probably has a broader reach than the idea of constitutional 
hardball. 
21. They could reasonably have believed that his false statements were a 
high crime or misdemeanor according to accepted interpretations of those 
terms (as referring to serious criminal misconduct or to misconduct, whether 
or not amounting to a serious crime, that cast doubt on the president's fitness 
to continue in office), or that the House had the power to impeach a president 
whenever it judged, according to whatever standards it chose, that he had 
committed a high crime or misdemeanor (a position associated with then-
Representative Gerald Ford, in remarks made in 1970, quoted in GEOFFREY 
STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 362 (4th ed. 2001) ("an impeachable 
offense is whatever a majority of the House of Representatives considers it to 
be at a given moment in history")). 
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presidents.22 Those attempts were never pursued with any 
seriousness. One can combine that fact with the evidence from 
impeachments of federal judges to identify yet another pre-
constitutional understanding: the House of Representatives should 
not aggressively carry out an impeachment inquiry unless, from 
the outset, there is a reasonable probability that the inquiry will 
result in the target's removal from office. The Clinton 
impeachment was inconsistent with that understanding. 
Constitutional hardball has another characteristic. The 
stakes are quite high when politicians play it. The Democrats' 
filibusters are designed in the first instance to prevent the 
President from transforming the federal circuit courts by 
appointing a large number of judges whom the Democrats regard 
as far too conservative for the nation's good.23 The Republicans' 
districting efforts are designed to increase the number of seats 
that Republican candidates are likely to win, thereby enhancing 
the likelihood that Republicans will retain control of the House of 
Representatives through the next census and ensuing 
redistricting. The case of the Clinton impeachment is a bit more· 
complicated. Then-Vice President AI Gore would have replaced 
Clinton as president had the impeachment been followed by a· 
conviction. There would have been no change in partisan control 
of the executive branch. Still, the Republican leadership in the 
House of Representatives might reasonably have believed that 
Clinton's impeachment would substantially weaken the political 
position of the White House's occupant, whether that person be 
Clinton or Gore.24 
I have described constitutional hardball as a strategy rational 
politicians adopt.25 It comes in an offensive form, when politicians 
22. For example, such papers were filed in connection with the Iran-contra 
affair. See Jonathan Turley, Senate Trials and Factional Disputes: 
Impeachment as a Madisonian Device, 49 DUKE L.J. 1, 77 n.366 (1999) 
(describing a resolution on impeachment that was filed and referred to the 
Judiciary Committee, which took no further action). 
23. Although I have no direct evidence of this, I believe that the filibusters 
are aimed-perhaps more importantly-at deterring the president from 
nominating an equally conservative person for a vacancy on the Supreme 
Court, should one appear prior to the 2004 elections. 
24. For additional discussion of the Clinton impeachment, see infra note 72. 
25. Louis Michael Seidman has suggested to me that there is another form 
of constitutional hardball, which he believes is more important. In the 
alternative version, politicians play constitutional hardball out of an 
essentially irrational belief that their political opponents are so deeply wrong 
that their continuation in office, or the possibility of their becoming dominant, 
is a threat to everything for which the nation stands. Seidman points to the 
impeachment example, where the Republicans in the House of Representative 
must have known that they had no chance of removing Clinton from office 
(and that, if they did, they would get Al Gore in his place). My argument, that 
the House Republicans had an eye on the 2000 presidential elections, seems 
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from a minority party see the opportunity open for a (possible) 
permanent transformation of their status. Such politicians play 
constitutional hardball to change their status. It also comes in a 
defensive form, when politicians in a dominant party see the 
possibility that they may be permanently displaced from power. 
These politicians play constitutional hardball to preserve their 
status. 
B. Constitutional Hardball and Partisan Entrenchment 
The high-stakes characteristic of constitutional hardball 
shows that hardball is an element of the more general 
phenomenon Jack Balkin and Sanford Levinson identified as 
partisan entrenchment.26 According to Balkin and Levinson, large-
scale changes in deep institutional arrangements occur through a 
process of partisan entrenchment. 
Balkin and Levinson focus on partisan entrenchment in the 
courts. "When a party wins the White House, it can stock the 
federal judiciary with members of its own party, assuming a 
relatively acquiescent Senate."27 In doing so, the president extends 
his party's policy positions, and its positions on the meaning of the 
Constitution, over a much longer period than his own presidency. 
And, once the judges are in place, "they start to change the 
understandings of the Constitution that appear in positive law."28 
For Balkin and Levinson, partisan entrenchment means that 
"[p]arties who control the presidency install jurists of their liking-
given whatever counterweight the Senate provides."29 
The process of partisan entrenchment should, I believe, be 
understood more broadly than in Balkin and Levinson's initial 
presentation.30 The full process of partisan entrenchment has 
strained to him. Seidman and I agree that both forms of constitutional 
hardball might well occur. 
26. Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional 
Revolution, 87 VA. L. REV. 1045 (2001). 
27. Id. at 1067. 
28. Id. 
29. Id. at 1076. 
30. Agreeing as I do with much of Balkin and Levinson's approach, I may 
seem a bit churlish in noting that, despite their acknowledgement that 
constitutional understandings develop outside the courts, their analysis is 
focused almost exclusively on the courts as locations for constitutional 
transformation. Perhaps it has that focus because Balkin and Levinson see 
Bush v. Gore as a much more important part of the story of partisan 
entrenchment than I do, and so minimize the importance of the games of 
constitutional hardball that were being played elsewhere. For another work 
acknowledging the value of Balkin and Levinson's work while criticizing it for 
some omissions, see Howard Gillman, Constitutional Law as Partisan 
Entrenchment: The Political Origins of Liberal Judicial Activism (unpublished 
paper in author's possession) available at http://www.yale 
.edu/lawlltw/paperslHw-gillman.pdfOast visited Nov. 14,2003). 
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several stages, in which control of the courts is only one phase.3 ! 
First, proponents of a particular set of arrangements gain control 
over one component of the government.32 They then use that 
control to devise mechanisms that ensure their continued control 
of that component. For example, they might develop ways of 
implementing civil service regulations, intended to eliminate 
partisan influence on the lower levels of the executive 
bureaucracy, so that lower-level bureaucrats are in fact committed 
to a particular partisan program.33 Or, perhaps more important, 
they set their substantive legislative or executive agenda to attract 
strong support from some, and to demobilize their opponents.a< 
Further, those who control one component of the government try 
to leverage that control into taking control of other components. 
Balkin and Levinson focus in particular on the ability of a partisan 
coalition that takes narrow control of the Senate and the 
presidency to gain much more extensive control over the judiciary, 
for a long term.35 
31. A signal of the need for a more expansive view of the process is the 
phrase assuming a relatively acquiescent Senate in Balkin and Levinson's 
account of partisan entrenchment in the courts. Balkin & Levinson, supra 
note 26, at 1067. The Democratic filibuster shows that we need not make such 
an assumption, even when the same party as the presidency formally controls 
the Senate. Compare with Balkin & Levinson, supra note 26, at 1083 
(describing Bush v. Gore as a case in which "five members of the Court us[edl 
their powers of judicial review to entrench their party in the Presidency, and 
thus, in effect, in the judiciary as well, because of the President's appointments 
power.") (emphasis added). 
32. My presentation contrasts with Balkin and Levinson's in part because I 
treat the courts as simply one of several components of the political system, all 
of which can play the leading role in partisan entrenchment. 
It is perfectly normal for Presidents to entrench members of their party 
in the judiciary as a means of shaping constitutional interpretation. 
That is the way most constitutional change occurs. It is quite another 
matter for members of the federal judiciary to select a president who 
will entrench like-minded colleagues in the judiciary. 
Id. at 1083. 
I note as well that Balkin and Levinson properly emphasize the 
temporal extent of entrenchment. The sense in which Bush v. Gore 
"entrenched" a Republican president is quite different from the sense in which 
a president entrenches his party's supporters in the courts. 
33. The techniques are familiar: exile to undesirable postings, assignment 
to unrewarding tasks, and unacknowledged political screening of applicants 
for appointment and promotion. 
34. An example might be development of legislative restrictions on the 
kinds of cases that lawyers supported by the Legal Services Corporation can 
bring, sometimes described as one of several means of "defunding the left." 
For the Supreme Court's consideration of a very small portion of those 
restrictions, see Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001). 
35. And, of course, the process oft partisan entrenchment might continue 
were the judiciary then to interpret the Constitution in ways that further 
entrenched the partisans in the presidency and Senate who put the judges in 
place. 
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The stakes are high when politicians play political hardball, 
that is, because the politicians believe that the winners might end 
up with permanent control (meaning, control for the full time-
horizon of today's politicians) of the entire government. The 
winner of constitutional hardball takes everything, and the loser 
loses everything. The next Part of this Essay examines the 
possibility that this characteristic of constitutional hardball can 
explain its emergence in particular political conjunctures (and its 
absence in others). 
II. ACCOUNTING FOR CONSTITUTIONAL HARDBALL 
This Part describes various aspects of constitutional hardball 
in more detail. I begin by expanding the argument that 
constitutional hardball is associated with changes from one 
constitutional order to another. I do so by examining the way 
constitutional hardball can be played with respect to institutional 
arrangements and with respect to substantive principles. The 
Part concludes by describing how the courts can play 
constitutional hardball. 
A. Constitutional Hardball and Institutional Arrangements 
The characteristics of constitutional hardball help explain its 
emergence. Consider, first, the fact that hardball arguments are 
not frivolous. The important point here is that this characteristic 
in itself cannot possibly identify an interesting phenomenon. 
Congress enacts constitutionally questionable legislation all the 
time, for which there are nonetheless non-frivolous arguments 
supporting constitutionality.36 When Congress does so, it is acting 
in a constitutionally ordinary way: enacting unconstitutional 
statutes that supporters believe to be constitutional. 
The term ordinary signals what we need to distinguish 
constitutional hardball, because it evokes Bruce Ackerman's 
distinction between ordinary politics and constitutional moments.37 
36. One obvious recent example is the federal flag burning statute enacted 
in the wake of Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989), and held 
unconstitutional in United States v. Eichmann, 486 U.S. 310 (1990). 1 believe 
that the Court's decisions were compelled by all coherent First Amendment 
theories, and that the federal statute was indistinguishable in principle from 
the state one earlier held unconstitutional. Even so, four justices would have 
upheld the federal statute against constitutional attack. Or, to take another 
example, the Communications Decency Act, held unconstitutional by a Court 
that was unanimous on the central issues in Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 
(1997), strikes me as, again, unconstitutional under any reasonable general 
First Amendment theory, but 1 can imagine developing a narrowly defined 
exception to standard theory for the communications covered by the Act. 
37. One need not accept Ackerman's analysis in all its glory (I do not) to 
acknowledge that he has identified something important in our constitutional 
practices by distinguishing between the ordinary and the extraordinary. 
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For present purposes, what matters in Ackerman's account is his 
description of U.S. constitutional history as consisting of long 
periods of ordinary politics separated by shorter periods, which 
Ackerman calls constitutional moments. On the descriptive level, 
the nation's fundamental institutional arrangements-the relations 
between President and Congress, the mechanisms by which 
politicians organize support among the public, and the principles 
that politicians take to guide the development of public policy-
differ after a constitutional moment has passed. So, for example, 
interest groups played one role in national politics before the New 
Deal, a different one after the New Deal constitutional 
transformation was completed.3s 
My suggestion is that constitutional hardball is the way 
constitutional law is practiced distinctively during periods of 
constitutional transformation.39 I do not mean to imply that it is 
the only way constitutional law is practiced during such periods. 
Precisely because such periods can be extended, a great deal of 
ordinary legislation will be enacted during each one, and some of 
that legislation will be subject to ordinary constitutional challenge. 
Rather, I suggest, constitutional hardball singles out 
constitutional practices associated with constitutional 
transformation. One important implication follows from this 
suggestion: one should not be able to observe episodes of 
constitutional hardball during periods of ordinary politics.40 
Here the relevance of the second characteristic of 
constitutional hardball becomes apparent. One way to distinguish 
periods of ordinary politics from periods of transformation is that 
during the former pre-constitutional understandings are taken for 
granted, whereas during the latter such understandings are 
brought into question. The idea is that the institutional 
arrangements characteristic of a particular constitutional order-
characteristic, that is, of each specific period of ordinary politics-
are the presuppositions accepted by all politically significant 
actors in that period, whereas the whole point of constitutional 
transformation is to alter the previously taken-for-granted 
institutional arrangements. Of course the proponents of 
transformation are going to place pre-constitutional 
understandings in question, because they want to replace those 
38. For my account ofthe differences, see TUSHNET, supra note 1, at 12. 
39. My primary disagreement with Ackerman is that he believes (for good 
reasons within his own project) that constitutional moments must occur in 
relatively compressed time frames (as the term moments suggests), while I 
believe that constitutional transformations can occur over substantially 
extended periods. For a discussion of this disagreement, see id. at 3. 
40. For a discussion, see infra te~t. accompanying notes 82-85. To adopt 
scientific terminology that I think inappropriate for this subject, one might say 
that finding constitutional hardball during periods of ordinary politics would 
refute the hypothesis I am suggesting. 
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understandings with others. A crude example, far more crude 
than a full analysis would be: prior to the New Deal, Congress 
initiated legislation subject to modest review by the President, 
whereas after the New Deal the President initiated legislation 
subject to modest review by Congress. And, during the 
transformative period when Franklin D. Roosevelt was attempting 
to construct a new constitutional order, his efforts to seize the 
legislative initiative were understood to be challenges to settled 
pre-constitutional understandings about the relation between 
President and Congress-and, as such, revolutionary. 
The association between constitutional hardball and 
constitutional transformation explains, finally, the fact that the 
stakes are high when a game of constitutional hardball is 
underway. The stakes are high because those who benefit from 
the institutional arrangements in place, and challenged by 
proponents of dramatically different institutional arrangements, 
reasonably fear that they will permanently lose political power if 
new institutional arrangements are put in place. After all, the 
proponents of new arrangements are politicians seeking power by 
offering their vision of the public good to the public for 
consideration and adoption. Of course the politicians holding 
power during one period of ordinary politics are afraid that they 
will lose power if new institutional arrangements are put in place, 
because the people who seek to construct those new arrangements 
are their opponents in ordinary politics who have found 
themselves unable to prevail under the existing arrangements. 
So far my exposition of constitutional hardball has 
emphasized proposals for departing from settled pre-constitutional 
understandings about institutional arrangements themselves. 
The relation between constitutional hardball and constitutional 
transformation should be apparent in that context. Only slightly 
different are the examples I used to illustrate the idea of 
constitutional hardball. There constitutional hardball is directed 
at settled processes for adopting public policy. Proponents of 
constitutional transformation play constitutional hardball when 
they try to displace settled processes with ones that would make it 
easier for them to put in place the new institutional arrangements 
they favor. 
Consider some examples used earlier in this Essay. 
Revisiting congressional districting to enhance the probability that 
one party will gain a more stable majority in the House of 
Representatives is this kind of constitutional hardball. So too is 
the very term entrenchment used by Balkin and Levinson. It 
shows that the goal partisans seek is control over substantive 
policy during the extended period of ordinary politics they hope 
will follow once their control is entrenched. 
The example Balkin and Levinson use-using narrow 
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majorities to gain control over the judiciary-is a bit more 
complex. I believe that its structure is two-fold. First, an 
entrenched judiciary is in a position to insulate from constitutional 
challenge partisan victories narrowly won on substantive 
legislation. As we will see, such substantive legislation might 
itself form the platform for extending partisan control in the 
legislature. Second, an entrenched judiciary might be in a position 
to secure victories that a partisan coalition is unable to achieve in 
the legislature.41 The classic example of this phenomenon is the 
mutually reinforcing role of Congress and the Supreme Court 
during the Second Reconstruction of the 1960s. The courts acted 
to assist the civil rights movement at points where, for reasons the 
adherents of the Democratic majority believed entirely 
contingent,42 Congress was unable to act. 
B. Constitutional Hardball and Substantive Principles 
The example of the Second Reconstruction introduces an 
important aspect of constitutional hardball that my exposition so 
far has failed to discuss. That aspect is the use of constitutional 
hardball on matters of substance rather than matters of 
institutional arrangements or matters of the policy-making 
process. 
Constitutional orders combine enduring institutional 
arrangements with principles of public policy that guide decision-
makers as they operate within those institutions. So, for example, 
a president will propose new statutes that implement the 
constitutional order's principles,43 members of Congress will do so 
as well," and the courts will uphold statutes that are consistent 
with the order's principles and invalidate those that are not. 45 
41. Obviously, its ability to do so depends importantly on the constitutional 
theory of judicial power associated with the constitutional understandings 
held by the proponents of constitutional transformation. More specifically, 
this mechanism of partisan entrenchment will be unavailable to those who 
propose to entrench institutional arrangements that minimize the role of 
courts in policy-making (unless, as may be possible, their principles 
distinguish between the judicial role during the period of transition and that 
role during the ensuing period of ordinary politics). 
42. That is, the difficulty of overcoming a filibuster conducted by a minority 
in the Senate. 
43. Where, that is, one of the constitutional order's institutional 
arrangements gives the president a large role in initiating public policy. 
44. And may reject presidential proposals they believe to be inconsistent 
with the order's guiding principles. 
45. This accounts for the widely noted phenomenon that most of what the 
Supreme Court does is to invalidate "old" statutes-those enacted before the 
current constitutional order came into being-or statutes that are "outliers," in 
force only in states or localities that have not (yet) been touched by the 
constitutional transformation that led other states to take similar statutes off' 
the books. 
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Political actors can play constitutional hardball with 
substantive principles. Proponents of a constitutional 
transformation will propose legislation that pushes the envelope of 
existing constitutional doctrine. The proposed statutes will not be 
obviously unconstitutional,46 because constitutional hardball 
consists of actions that are plausibly defensible under existing 
constitutional doctrine. But, they will signal that their proponents 
have a substantially different understanding of government's role 
than had seemed settled. And, importantly, the proposals, if 
enacted, might have the effect of enhancing the political strength 
ofthe coalition seeking to change the constitutional order. 
The New Deal provides good examples of how political actors 
can play constitutional hardball on substantive matters, the Great 
Society other examples that are a bit less effective. The New 
Deal's labor legislation was questionable under existing doctrine. 
The Supreme Court invalidated the wage-and-hour provisions of 
the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935 in Carter v. Carter 
Coal CO.,47 holding that Congress lacked the power under the 
Commerce Clause to regulate such "local" economic activities. 
That holding clearly threatened the National Labor Relations Act, 
the centerpiece of New Deal labor legislation, which established a 
structure for regulating labor relations that progressives and labor 
unions had been seeking for years. As Peter Irons and Barry 
Cushman have shown, the NLRA was not patently 
unconstitutional under existing doctrine.48 Yet, the lawyers 
working on the statute and the cases that arose after its 
enactment knew that they had their work cut out for them, 
because they knew that the statute pushed aggressively against 
the constitutional limits the Court had established. 
Further, the NLRA rested on assumptions about the role of 
government in labor relations that differed substantially from the 
assumptions previously held. The NLRA substituted government 
supervision of bargaining between employers and employees, 
pursuant to legislatively specified procedures and subject to some 
legislatively specified constraints on tactics, for bargaining-
whether individual or collective - regulated solely by the 
participants' power in the marketplace, subject to standard 
common law rules regarding force and fraud. And, finally, the 
NLRA was likely to extend the Democratic party's political hold in 
two ways. Labor unions whose organizing task was eased by the 
NLRA could be expected to reward the Democratic party by giving 
46. Although they might be quite questionable. 
47. 298 U.S. 238 (1936). 
48. BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE 
OF A CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION (1998); PETER H. IRONS, THE NEW DEAL 
LAWYERS (1982). 
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it political support.'9 And, progressives who favored professional 
management of society could be expected to do the same, finding 
the NLRA's regulatory principles consonant with their 
professionalist presuppositions. 
The Voting Rights Act of 1965 provides a parallel, albeit less 
crisp, example.50 The political effects of the Act, its proponents 
believed, would benefit the Democratic party by offsetting the 
party's losses in the South due to its support of the civil rights 
movement. The Act displaced state control over voting procedures, 
substituting regulation by federal bureaucrats in the Department 
of Justice through the Act's "preclearance" mechanism. The Act 
challenged pre-constitutional understandings about "states' 
rights." The pre-constitutional understanding that states had 
such rights had, for all practical purposes, disappeared when 
Congress acted to regulate the national economy, but they 
remained embedded with respect to much else that states did. 51 
Those pre-constitutional understandings were reflected In 
constitutional doctrine that suggested the impropriety of 
congressional action displacing the mechanisms of state 
government even as Congress's power to displace the substance of 
what those governments did was clearly established. 52 
The Supreme Court, of course, upheld the constitutionality of 
the NLRA53 and the Voting Rights Act.54 In doing so, it acted 
pursuant to yet another principle guiding the New Deal and Great 
Society's constitutional order, one that blended institutional 
arrangements with matters of substance. That principle was that 
the courts and the political branches should be collaborators in 
developing public policy. 55 This principle simply states what 
49. It is worth emphasizing that prior to the New Deal members of the 
skilled trades who were organized into unions provided significant support to 
Republican candidates. See JOSEPH G. RAYBACK, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN 
LABOR 298-99 (1966). 
50. The example is less crisp because the Great Society was an extension 
rather than a repudiation of the New Deal. 
51. As late as 1961, Herbert Wechsler continued to defend the proposition 
that state regulation was the norm in our constitutional system, federal 
regulation the exception. See HERBERT WECHSLER, PRINCIPLES, POLITICS, 
AND FUNDAMENTAL LAw 52 (1961) ("National action has ... always been 
regarded as exceptional in our polity. .. [Tlhose who would advocate its 
exercise must. .. answer the preliminary question why the matter should not 
be left to the states.") (reprinting an article originally published in 1954). 
52. For a description of the doctrines that could be called upon to challenge 
aspects of the Voting Rights Act, see South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 
301,358-62 (1966) (Black, J., concurring and dissenting). 
53. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). 
54. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966). 
55. For a more extensive discussion, see Mark Tushnet, The Supreme Court 
and the National Political Order: Collaboration and Confrontation, in THE 
SUPREME COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT (Ronald Kahn & 
Ken Kersch eds., forthcoming). 
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happens once a constitutional order is in place: all of the 
government's institutions operate harmoniously, implementing the 
order's characteristic substantive principles and dividing labor 
according to the order's characteristic institutional 
arrangements. 56 
C. The Courts in Constitutional Hardball 
The flip-side of collaboration during constitutional orders is 
conflict during the transition between one constitutional order and 
another. That possibility has been implicit in my account so far. 
The very fact that the proposals offered by proponents of 
constitutional transformation are constitutionally questionable 
implies that there is a decent chance that the courts will find them 
unconstitutional if enacted. But, an upsurge of conflict suggests 
more than substantive disagreement. It may be the distinctive 
way in which the courts play constitutional hardball. Again, we 
have to figure out some way to distinguish between ordinary 
constitutional invalidations, of a sort that will occur during 
periods when a constitutional order is stable, and invalidations 
that indicate deeper, potentially transformative conflicts. 
I offer a suggestion for such a method of distinguishing, 
qualified by the observation that it may reflect both a 
preoccupation with recent events, and my view that we have been 
in an extended period of constitutional transformation. The 
suggestion is that we can identify judicial constitutional hardball 
by observing the courts expressly denying that the Constitution 
imposes an obligation of collaboration on them. That denial might 
occur in judicial rhetoric or in constitutional doctrine. The first 
possibility is suggested by the argument captured in the titles of 
two recent articles by Ruth Colker and her co-authors: "Dis sing 
Congress" and "Dis sing States."57 The second is suggested by the 
Supreme Court's recent decisions on the scope of Congress's power 
to enforce Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Particularly telling is the tension between Justice Anthony 
Kennedy's observation that Congress has "the duty to make its 
own informed judgment on the meaning and force of the 
Constitution," although that duty arises only when "Congress acts 
within its sphere of power and responsibilities,"58 and the holding 
of the case in which he made that observation, which was that the 
56. In my view, a system of more or less permanently divided government 
can be a harmoniously operating constitutional order, when the parties 
controlling the different branches agree to keep their disagreements within 
understood bounds, and accept that each will win only small victories. 
57. Ruth Colker & James Brudney, Dissing Congress, 100 MICH. L. REV. 80 
(2001); Ruth Colker & Kevin M. Scott, Dissing States: Invalidation of State 
Action During the Rehnquist Era, 88 VA. L. REV. 1301 (2002). 
58. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 535 (1997). 
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Supreme Court would decide whether Congress had discharged 
that responsibility in a manner conforming to the Constitution. As 
Reva Siegel and Robert Post have forcefully argued, the Court's 
decisions are best understood precisely as articulating a doctrine 
denying that collaboration between the courts and the political 
branches is a constitutionally mandated mechanism for 
elaborating the Constitution's meaning. 59 
III. MARBURYV. MADISON AS CONSTITUTIONAL HARDBALL 
Marbury v. Madison can be understood as one event in a 
longer episode of constitutional hardball, with one important 
qualification that I mention at the outset. Constitutional hardball 
involves practices and arguments that are inconsistent with 
settled pre-constitutional understandings. But, the U.S. 
Constitution was still young in 1801. Pre-constitutional 
understandings were not settled at all, and indeed the longer 
episode of which Marbury was part might be understood as a 
conflict over what the nation's first pre-constitutional 
understandings were to be-particularly, whether our 
constitutional arrangements should be predicated on the 
assumption that political conflict on the national level would be 
conducted through political parties that united factions in various 
states around a common program. It is not inconSIstent with the 
general idea of constitutional hardball to modify my specification 
of its characteristics to include the possibility that the conflict 
would be, not inconsistent with, but about pre-constitutional 
understandings. Still, the modification seems to me ad hoc, and I 
prefer simply to note the difference between Marbury's context 
and the other examples of constitutional hardball I have 
'd d 60 prOVl e . 
As Sanford Levinson has lamented, basic law school courses 
in constitutional law often fail to set Marbury in its larger 
context.61 That context begins with the emergence of national 
political parties in the 1790s, quite contrary to the Framers' 
expectations about how national politics would be organized. The 
59. Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal 
Antidiscrimination Legislation After Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441 
(2000); Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Protecting the Constitution from the 
People: Juricentric Restrictions on Section Five Power, 78 IND. L.J. 1 (2003); 
Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism and Section 
Five Power: Policentric Interpretation of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 
112 YALE L.J. 1943 (2003). 
60. Of course, were others to identify additional examples of conflicts over 
pre-constitutional understandings, I would happily modify my description of 
constitutional hardball's defining characteristics. 
61. Sanford Levinson, Why I Do Not Teach Marbury (Except to Eastern 
Europeans) and Why You Shouldn't Either, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 553 
(2003). 
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Federalist party, centered on Alexander Hamilton's ambitious 
program for creating a centralized commercial republic with 
strong ties to Great Britain, confronted the Democratic-Republican 
party, centered on Thomas Jefferson's vision of a republic of sturdy 
and independent yeomen, sympathetic to the spread of republican 
sentiment they saw occurring in France. 
The presidential election of 1796 saw the first nationally 
organized campaigns. John Adams won a narrow electoral college 
victory over Jefferson, with the candidates' support quite 
concentrated regionally (Adams' in the North, Jefferson's in the 
South). Article II reflected the Framers' failure to anticipate the 
emergence of nationally organized political parties, providing that 
the president would be the person who received the most votes in 
the electoral college and the vice-president the person who 
received the next highest number of votes.52 Article II meant that 
Adams became president, Jefferson vice president in 1796. 
Partisan conflict continued, exemplified by the Federalists' 
enactment of the Sedition Act of 1798, which made it an offense to 
publish "false, scandalous, and malicious" criticisms of the 
national government, Congress, or the president-but not the vice 
president-and which was sunsetted so that it expired on March 4, 
1801, the day the president to be elected in 1800 would take office. 
The candidates in the 1800 election were Adams and Jefferson, 
and, as historian Paul Finkelman puts it, "If Adams won 
reelection, he would not need the law; and if Jefferson won, he 
could not turn the law on Adams's supporters."63 
Article II's defects in a world of nationally organized political 
parties came home to roost in the election. The Democratic-
Republicans got more electoral votes than the Federalists. The 
problem was that the members of the electoral college could not 
cast their votes separately for a president and a vice president. A 
well-organized party would agree that all its supporters in the 
electoral college would cast their votes for the party's presidential 
candidate, and all but one would vote for the party's vice 
presidential candidate. And, indeed, that is what the Federalists 
did. The Jeffersonians were not that well-organized, though, and 
Jefferson and his party's vice presidential candidate Aaron Burr 
received the same number of votes. The ambitious Burr saw this 
as an opportunity to become president and refused to accede to 
pressure that he allow Jefferson to assume the presidency. That 
62. The provisions of Article II are even more complicated, because they 
also reflected the Framers' assumption that it would be rare for the person 
with the highest number of votes to have a majority of the electoral votes as 
well (because, they thought, many candidates would be "favorite sons" with 
support only in their home states). 
63. Paul Finkelman, Election, Presidential, 1800, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 421 (Leonard W. Levy & Louis Fisher eds., 1994). 
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cast the election to the House of Representatives, where the first 
play of constitutional hardball occurred. Adams's party saw its 
opportunity in Burr's ambition, and six states with Federalist 
majorities in their House delegations cast their votes for Burr. 
Because two states were divided between Federalists and 
Democratic-Republicans, Jefferson received only eight votes in the 
House, one short of the required majority. After about a week of 
unsuccessful maneuvering, the Federalists backed down. The 
Federalist representatives in the two divided states abstained 
from voting, giving their states' votes to Jefferson, and the 
Federalists in two states with Federalist majorities cast blank 
ballots. Jefferson thereby received ten votes and became 
president. Jefferson's party also became the majority party in the 
House and Senate. 
The Federalists may have acted like statesmen with respect 
to the presidency, but they were not done yet. The Constitution 
provided for quite a long period between the time when a new 
president was elected and the time he took office, in this case from 
November 1800 to March 4, 1801. The previous Congress, 
dominated by Federalists, and Adams remained in place, 
empowered to enact whatever laws they could. Pursuing a 
program of court reform to which they had been committed before 
the election, the Federalists enacted the Judiciary Act of 1801, 
which President Adams signed on February 13. The Act abolished 
the existing circuit courts, which consisted of a district judge and 
two Supreme Court justices, and created six new circuit courts in 
their place, with new positions for sixteen circuit judges. The Act 
also reduced the number of Supreme Court justices from six to 
five, to take effect as soon as a sitting justice left office. It also 
substantially increased the scope of federal jurisdiction, consistent 
with the Federalists' centralizing program. Some aspects of the 
1801 Judiciary Act, particularly the abolition of the duty imposed 
by the original Judiciary Act of 1789 on Supreme Court justices to 
sit on circuit courts, were sensible reforms. But, the political 
context meant that most of the Act's provisions were seen by 
Jeffersonians as an attempt by Federalists to entrench themselves 
in the courts as they were forced to depart from the presidency and 
control of Congress. To Jeffersonians, that is, the 1801 Act was 
constitutional hardball. 
Jeffersonians responded in kind. Once they controlled 
Congress and the presidency, they repealed the 1801 Act. The 
Judiciary Act of 1802 abolished the new circuit courts. 
Jeffersonians knew that the repeal was constitutionally 
questionable. True, Article III vested the nation's judicial power 
in the Supreme Court "and in such inferior Courts as the Congress 
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may from time to time ordain and establish."64 But, abolishing the 
circuit courts meant eliminating the new circuit judges, which 
might have been taken to violate the Constitution's guarantee that 
federal judges hold office "during good Behavior.»65 Concerned that 
the Supreme Court might agree that eliminating the new courts 
was unconstitutional, Jeffersonians enacted another statute that 
postponed the Supreme Court's next term, hoping that, the circuit 
judges having been out of office (or at least out of money) for a year 
or more, the issue would have faded by the time the Court 
considered the 1802 Act's constitutionality.66 
The big fights in 1801 and 1802 were thus over statutes that 
substantially reorganized the federal judiciary. Marbury involved 
another statute entirely, enacted two weeks after the 1801 
Judiciary Act, which created forty-two positions for justices of the 
peace in the District of Columbia. President Adams and the 
Senate rushed through nominations and confirmations, and 
Adams signed the commissions for all the new magistrates. As I 
have noted, the nation's government was still young and, 
importantly, small. The Secretary of State, in addition to his 
duties in foreign affairs, was given the duty to transmit 
commissions to federal officials; it made sense for him to do so for 
ambassadors, after all, and why duplicate bureaucracies for 
judicial appointments? John Marshall became Adams's Secretary 
of State in May 1800. He was nominated for Chief Justice on 
January 20, 1801-after Jefferson's election, of course-and 
confirmed by the Senate on January 27. Roughly six weeks 
remained before Jefferson took office, and Marshall continued to 
serve as Secretary of State for a brief period even after he took the 
oath of office as Chief Justice.57 He put the seal of the United 
States on the commissions and started shipping them out. Four 
remained undelivered on the morning of March 4, 1801, when 
Marshall left the office to swear Jefferson in as president. James 
Madison, the new Secretary of State, found the commissions on 
64. U.S. CaNST. art. III, § 1. 
65. [d. 
66. Even the postponement of the Court's term, of course, was 
constitutional hardball, because there were substantial arguments that 
Congress lacks the power to control the details of administration within the 
judicial branch. The Supreme Court acceded to Congress's direction and 
postponed its term. In itself, that action did not confirm Congress's power, 
because the Court's action could be interpreted as a decision taken by the 
Court itself, informed by and consonant with Congress's views but not-from 
the Court's point of view-an action compelled by Congress. 
67. I do not believe Marshall's dual office holding is an example of 
constitutional hardball. Jefferson asked that Marshall stay on as Secretary of 
State. See R. KENT NEWMYER, JOHN MARsHALL AND THE HEROIC AGE OF THE 
SUPREME COURT 141 (2001) (referring to Jefferson's request). In any event, 
the rudimentary structure of the national government required more 
flexibility in staffing national offices than we have come to think appropriate. 
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the desk when he arrived on March 5. Jefferson directed that the 
commissions be withheld. Marbury v. Madison ensued. 
The stakes are high in constitutional hardball. The Judiciary 
Acts of 1801 and 1802 were episodes of constitutional hardball 
because the stakes there were the control of the national 
government as a whole. If the Jeffersonians prevailed, they would 
have control over all three branches of the national government, 
while if the Federalists did, the Federalists would have a foothold 
in the judiciary, which they could use to constrain what Congress 
and, especially, the president did. Marbury was constitutional 
hardball too, not because the statute creating justices of peace in 
the District of Columbia had any real importance, but because it 
raised the question of whether the Federalists would be able to use 
their control of the judiciary to discipline Congress and the 
president. 
Indeed, the question in Marbury was even more refined. The 
power of the federal courts to enforce constitutional limitations on 
congressional power was essentially unquestioned when Marbury 
was decided. Two things were contested, though, and Marbury 
brought them together. The courts could invalidate congressional 
legislation when a constitutional question was brought before 
them in a proper case. So, for example, the courts could refuse to 
enforce a criminal statute that was, in their view, unconstitutional 
because, by implicating the courts in enforcement, Congress 
necessarily acceded to giving the courts the last word on 
constitutionality. The first contested question was, where 
Congress acted on its own, that is, did not call on the courts for 
assistance in implementing public policy, could the courts 
somehow find Congress's actions unconstitutional? The second 
contested question distinguished Congress from the presidency. 
Assuming that the courts can hold federal statutes 
unconstitutional, could they find executive actions taken pursuant 
to statutory law-actions that were not ultra vires the statutes-
but not compelled by statute unlawful and therefore subject to 
judicial control? 
Jefferson's refusal to deliver Marbury's commission raised 
both contested questions. In the ordinary course, courts were not 
involved in delivering or withholding commissions. And, 
obviously, no statute compelled Jefferson's decision. Marshall 
played hardball in Marbury by resolving both contested questions 
in a way that allowed the (Federalist-dominated) courts to be 
continuing supervisors of the actions taken by the (Jeffersonian-
dominated) Congress and presidency. He did so by construing the 
federal statutes defining the federal courts' jurisdiction to 
authorize the federal courts to issue writs of mandamus to high 
executive officials, where the courts concluded that the statutes 
regulating the officials' actions limited their discretion. 
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Marshall's move has a certain brilliance to it. On its face, a 
mandamus proceeding differs from a criminal prosecution because 
in the latter the government-the executive, authorized by 
Congress-comes to the courts and asks for their help, whereas in 
the former a private party asks the court to help him or her 
against an executive official. Marshall's move was to assimilate 
the two cases by saying that in both Congress has authorized 
someone to ask the courts for help, and having done so allows the 
courts to supervise what Congress and executive officials have 
done. Judicial review for constitutionality in appropriate cases 
was uncontroversial in the early 1800s, but judicial supremacy in 
constitutional interpretation was. By creating a jurisdictional 
regime in which private parties could bring federal officials into 
court, Marshall moved far in the direction of establishing judicial 
supremacy.68 
Marbury itself was an episode of constitutional hardball for 
many reasons. The logic of Marshall's opinion is, as every student 
of the case knows, hardly iron-clad. Yet, like all examples of 
constitutional hardball, the arguments Marshall made, while 
perhaps strained, were at no point frivolous. Marshall made the 
stakes high by treating the case as one implicating the power of 
the courts, the last bastion of Federalist control, to supervise the 
other branches, controlled by Jeffersonians. And, of course, 
Marshall managed to establish the power of the courts to control 
the other branches in a decision that made it impossible for 
Jefferson to fight back directly. Marshall ended up saying that the 
courts had the power to impose the Constitution's disciplines on 
the president without actually doing so on Marbury's behalf. 
Yet, it remains an open question whether Marshall actually 
succeeded in the short- to medium-run. Of course Marbury is 
taken to establish the power of judicial review, but no one really 
disputed that. What Marshall wanted, as a player of 
constitutional hardball, was to discipline the Jeffersonians. But, 
the Jeffersonians and their successors, the Jacksonian Democrats, 
controlled national policy-making for decades after 1803. 
Marshall remained on the Court until 1835, and during his tenure 
the Court never held unconstitutional any federal statute 
important to the Jeffersonian-Jacksonian program.69 
68. Far, but not all the way. Even on Marshall's analysis, Congress could 
insulate its programs from constitutional supervision by the courts if it figured 
out some way to eliminate the possibility of a private party's offensive suit 
against the government-eliminating the writ of mandamus in a class of cases, 
for example (although doing so might be quite difficult, in light of the ability of 
a recalcitrant judiciary to construe the jurisdictional statutes creatively). 
69. It is not even clear to me that the Marshall Court's invalidations of 
state laws, some of which were part of Democratic initiatives, were all that 
important either. For an analysis, see Michael Klarman, How Great Were the 
"Great" Marshall Court Decisions?, 87 VA. L. REV. 1111 (2001). 
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IV. ELABORATIONS: BRUSHBACKS AND FAILURES 
I have described constitutional hardball as a symptom of the 
possibility of a shift in the governing assumptions of a 
constitutional order. Political leaders play hardball when they 
believe that they are in a position to shift from one order to 
another, or when they believe themselves to be threatened with 
the possibility of such a shift. But, we might observe 
constitutional hardball in a number of variants because initiating 
hardball depends on perceptions by political leaders of possibilities, 
and not on some objectively ascertainable conditions. 
A. The First Variant: Brushbacks 
Franklin D. Roosevelt's court-packing plan of 1937 is an 
example of what we could call the brushback. Roosevelt proposed 
to expand the size of the Supreme Court, nominally to provide 
elderly justices with assistance in performing the Court's work by 
allowing them to spread the workload across a larger Court with 
younger members. Everyone knew, though, that this rationale for 
expanding the Court was not the real one. Roosevelt wanted to 
expand the Court so that he could appoint enough new members to 
guarantee that New Deal programs, subject to non-trivial 
constitutional challenges under then-existing doctrine, would be 
upheld as constitutional. 
The court-packing plan satisfies the conditions I have given 
for constitutional hardball. Nothing in the Constitution expressly 
limits the power of the political branches to set the size of the 
Supreme Court. Perhaps we might devise an argument that 
changes in the size of the Court are constitutionally permissible 
only when they are motivated by policy concerns about the Court's 
efficient operation,70 but even if we did it would remain true that 
the court-packing plan was constitutionally defensible within 
70. There would be difficulty both in doing so generally, and applying any 
such criterion to the court-packing plan itself. Prior to the New Deal the 
political branches had adjusted the Court's size because of purely political 
considerations, shrinking its size as vacancies occurred during the presidency 
of Andrew Johnson and expanding it once Johnson left office. Moreover, 
Roosevelt's stated rationale for the plan would satisfy any requirement that 
expansions be justified by public policy concerns. It could be attacked only if 
we had a robust doctrine allowing challenges to statutes whose stated 
rationales, while acceptable in themselves, are pretexts for impermissible 
goals. But, although the Court has stated such a doctrine, the doctrine is 
hardly robust. See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 423 
(1819) (stating "should Congress, under the pretext of executing its powers, 
pass laws for the accomplishment of objects not entrusted to the government[,] 
it would become the painful duty of this tribunal .... to say that such an act 
was not the law of the land"); Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20 
(1922) (relying on the "pretext" doctrine to invalidate the federal Child Labor 
Tax Act). 
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existing doctrine. But, of course, the plan was inconsistent with a 
pre-constitutional understanding that the Court's size should not 
be manipulated for merely political purposes, and, particularly, 
simply to guarantee that a reconstituted Court would reach 
politically desirable results. And, finally, Roosevelt proposed the 
plan because he believed that he was in position to bring about a 
constitutional transformation. 
What is interesting about the Court-packing plan is that, 
while Roosevelt's belief about the prospect of constitutional 
transformation was (or turned out to be) correct, the plan itself 
failed. The conventional story, though, is that the Court-packing 
plan brought about the transformation, as the Court's majority-or, 
more precisely, Justice Owen Roberts-changed its views in 
reaction to the threat the plan posed. Recent scholarship has 
persuasively challenged that story in its most pristine form,71 but 
that challenge is irrelevant here. The Court-packing plan 
illustrates the possibility that an episode of constitutional hardball 
can produce constitutional transformation by intimidating the 
political opposition. That is why I call the possibility one of a 
brushback, which in baseball is a pitch designed to intimidate the 
batter. 
B. A Second Variant: Failures 
The brushback shows that particular instances of 
constitutional hardball can fail in the small but succeed in the 
large.72 There is another interesting category, where a political 
actor plays constitutional hardball and simply fails. 
Some examples of failed constitutional hardball are these. (1) 
In the late 1960s Richard Nixon attempted to impound money 
Congress had appropriated for specific purposes, arguing that as 
president he had a constitutional obligation to control spending in 
the service of the macroeconomic goal of controlling inflation. 
Again, the conditions for constitutional hardball existed. Nixon's 
constitutional claims were something of a stretch under existing 
doctrine,73 but they were not frivolous. The prevailing pre-
constitutional understanding, though, was that the president had 
to spend what Congress appropriated, because there was 
71. See CUSHMAN, supra note 48, at 33. 
72. I think it plausible to treat the impeachment of Bill Clinton as a 
brushback, which achieved its effect not in the removal of Clinton from office, 
but in weakening the political position of the presidential Democratic party in 
the 2000 presidential elections. 
73. I believe that the scholarly consensus is that Nixon's claim of 
presidential authority was not well-founded. See Philip B. Kurland, 
Impoundment of Funds in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 
967 (Leonard W. Levy ed., 1986) (noting "Where Congress has mandated the 
expenditure of funds in support of a legislative program, the President has no 
choice but to effectuate Congress's will"). 
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something distasteful about a president signing legislation with 
his fingers crossed, that is, with the thought that, no matter what 
the legislation said, the president could later decide against 
complying with it. Finally, Nixon's effort was part of a more 
general strategy among Republicans to wrest control over national 
policy from the Democrats who dominated Congress. The 
strategy, for present purposes, had two components. The 
Republican party's electoral strategy was to increase its 
representation in the South, gaining enough seats there to take 
control of Congress. Its constitutional strategy was to shift power 
in the national government from Congress, while it remained 
under Democratic control, to the presidency and the states, which 
Republicans could at least occasionally control. The only problem, 
of course, was that Nixon failed to transform the constitutional 
order.74 He believed that he was in a position to do so, but his 
analysis was wrong. 
(2) A decade and a half later, facing a judiciary that he and 
his administration believed controlled by its political opponents on 
substantive issues crucial to the administration's transformative 
agenda, Attorney General Edwin Meese asserted the president's 
right, under the Constitution, to advance his own constitutional 
views even in the face of contrary declarations by the Supreme 
Court.75 Meese's position was not constitutionally frivolous. 76 It 
generated enormous controversy, though,77 because it was 
inconsistent with settled understandings about the supremacy of 
the Court's constitutional interpretations. And, once again, the 
Reagan administration may have initiated a constitutional 
transformation, as I believe/8 or it may merely have attempted to 
do so, as its supporters believe, but it did not complete the 
transformation or, on other views, even succeed in starting one. 
(3) In the 1830s Andrew Jackson's political opponents 
believed they had an opportunity to push the Jacksonians out of 
power. The Federalist party had disintegrated in the 1810s, and 
the Jeffersonians had been transformed by Jackson's presidency. 
Henry Clay, among others, thought that it might be possible to 
revive something like the Federalist party. The Jacksonians were 
strongly opposed to the Bank of the United States, believing it to 
74. My view is that it took Ronald Reagan and Newt Gingrich, assisted by 
Bill Clinton, to do that. See TUSHNET, supra note 1, at 9-11. But, even if! am 
wrong in my claim that a new constitutional order has come into being, the 
point about Nixon's failure remains accurate. 
75. Edwin Meese, The Law of the Constitution, 61 TUL. L. REV. 979 (1987). 
76. Indeed, I believe it to be correct. See Mark Tushnet, The Supreme 
Court, the Supreme Law of the Land, and Attorney General Meese: A Comment, 
61 TUL. L. REV. 1017 (1987). 
77. For illustrations, see Symposium, Perspectives on the Authoritativeness 
of Supreme Court Decisions, 61 TuL. L. REV. 977 (1987). 
78. See TUSHNET, supra note 1, at 9. 
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be a tool by which moneyed elites oppressed ordinary people. Clay 
pushed a bill rechartering the Bank through Congress several 
years before necessary, to create an issue on which he and his 
political allies could go to the country in the presidential election 
of 1832. Jackson thereupon vetoed the rechartering. Jackson's 
veto relied on a combination of policy-based objections to the Bank 
and an argument against its constitutionality, notwithstanding 
the Supreme Court's decision otherwise in McCulloch v. 
Maryland. 79 Jackson decisively won the 1832 election, and Clay's 
party, eventually known as the Whigs, did not gain control of the 
government until more than a decade later. 
The bank-recharter episode fits my definition of constitutional 
hardball. Obviously, the timing of the Bank's renewal was 
entirely within Congress's constitutional power, and yet enacting 
legislation several years before it has any effect is in tension with 
ordinary practices. The president arguably has the bare 
constitutional authority to veto legislation on any ground 
whatever, and yet Jackson's veto message was inconsistent with 
the usual understandings about the veto power in two ways. It 
invoked policy grounds, whereas prior presidents had a strong 
though not uniform record of vetoing legislation only on 
constitutional grounds. so In addition, the constitutional reasons 
Jackson provided had been rejected by the Supreme Court, and 
asserting a constitutional ground in the face of a contrary 
Supreme Court decision was, again, unusual at the time. 
The examples of impoundment under Nixon, Meese's position 
on the president's authority to interpret the Constitution, and the 
bank recharter controversy show that constitutional hardball can 
fail. Political actors play constitutional hardball when they believe 
that a shift in constitutional orders is possible. They fail when 
that belief turns out to be mistaken. 
C. Do Failures Show That Constitutional Hardball Is Not 
Extraordinary ? 
The possibility of failure, though, might suggest that the very 
concept of constitutional hardball is not that useful. The difficulty 
is that the possibility of failure means that political actors might 
play constitutional hardball all the time. If they do, the concept 
fails to differentiate between ordinary forms of politics and 
extraordinary ones, and yet doing so is precisely what the concept 
is designed for. 
Here the role of perception and belief, and the willingness to 
79. For the veto message, see Andrew Jackson, Veto Message, in 2 
MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 576 (James D. Richardson ed., 
1900). 
80. On veto practices, see LOUIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS 
BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT 141-47 (1985). 
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act on perceptions and beliefs, matters a great deal. The testing 
case would be whether we could identify periods during which 
political leaders of the party out of power did not believe that they 
were in a position to transform the constitutional order and 
permanently regain power in a transformed order. In these 
periods political leaders believe the existing order to be quite 
stable.s1 During them, we would expect to see the opposition's 
political leaders accepting the existing order's institutions and 
organizing principles, and claiming only that they would be better 
at running those institutions and implementing those principles 
than the current incumbents. And, we would not expect to see the 
opposition's leaders trying to play constitutional hardball. 
Fortunately for me, I think there are such periods, and that 
the concept of constitutional hardball therefore retains some 
utility. The presidential campaigns of 1952 and 1960 are the 
easiest examples I can offer. In both the Republican presidential 
candidates accepted the principles of the New Deal constitutional 
order. The contrast between the campaigns of Richard Nixon in 
1960 and 1968 is particularly instructive here. In 1960 Nixon 
presented his program as more of the same-more of the 
competent administration of New Deal programs that Dwight 
Eisenhower's presidency had provided. The 1968 campaign was 
different. Nixon was influenced by Barry Goldwater's contention 
that the American people deserved a choice, not an echo,s2 and by 
his own understanding that he had to at least co-opt Goldwater's 
supporters if he was to win the party's nomination. Nixon also 
concluded that the decaying of the New Deal coalition under the 
pressure of the civil rights movement and the Vietnam War 
provided an opportunity for a real shift in the constitutional order. 
His successful 1968 campaign put the possibility of dramatic 
change on the political table.s3 
81. I have considered whether I ought to add another criterion, that the 
existing order actually be stable during these periods, and in the end 
concluded that I should not. I am not sure we could identify criteria, 
independent of the judgment of political leaders, to identify "true" stability. 
And, in any event, political leaders out of power have a strong incentive to act 
on beliefs that a transformation is possible, if they hold them. So, the beliefs 
political leaders hold will almost certainly be a good proxy for true stability 
anyway. 
82. The slogan Goldwater supporter Phyllis Schlafly used to describe his 
candidacy in a 1964 campaign publication. PHYLLIS SCHLAFLY, A CHOICE NOT 
AN ECHO (1964). 
83. I do not mean to suggest that Nixon campaigned openly on the 
possibility of constitutional transformation (except perhaps with respect to the 
roles of Congress and the president in determining national domestic policy), 
but only that his victory opened up possibilities that Nixon understood, 
because he had had to accommodate himself to the increasingly powerful 
Goldwater conservatives in the Republican party. After his election he 
acknowledged this accommodation, and its implications for basic 
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Putting this analysis in the terms I have developed, Nixon 
believed in 1968 that there was a possibility of constitutional 
transformation, and therefore began to play constitutional 
hardball. AF, it happened, Nixon misjudged either the situation or 
his own ability to win at constitutional hardball. But, the 
difference between his 1960 and 1968 campaigns shows that 
constitutional hardball need not be the ordinary condition of 
politics. 
Yet, the concept of constitutional hardball does seem to 
describe a lot of recent, that is, post-1980, political practices. The 
reason, I believe, that that we have been experiencing a quite 
extended period of constitutional transformation. Consider how 
things would look if we combined my idea of constitutional 
hardball with the descriptive portion of Bruce Ackerman's account 
of constitutional moments. In my terms, Ackerman's 
constitutional moments are concentrated periods during which our 
constitutional order shifts rapidly from one form to another. We 
would then expect to see constitutional hardball in the brief period 
surrounding a constitutional moment-just before it, as pre-
constitutional assumptions are brought into question, and just 
after it, as new pre-constitutional assumptions are put in place. 
And then, during the extended periods of what Ackerman calls 
ordinary politics, we would observe ordinary constitutional 
politics, that is, policy initiatives that might raise ordinary 
constitutional questions without challenging settled pre-
constitutional assumptions. 
The picture is different if constitutional transformation can 
take place over an extended period, as I believe it may have been 
since around 1980.84 Then we would observe an equally extended 
period in which political leaders played constitutional hardball. 
Indeed, it might come to seem as if constitutional hardball was the 
normal state of things rather than a symptom of the possibility of 
constitutional transformation. Transformation might seem like an 
ever-receding light at the end of the tunnel, and constitutional 
hardball the way politicians play day-to-day politics. 
V. SOME POSSIBLE NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS 
So far I have tried to keep my analysis as descriptive as 
possible. Still, I suspect that most readers are likely to think that 
there is something distasteful about constitutional hardball as a 
constitutional understandings, by ceding large parts of the Department of 
Justice to Goldwater conservatives. 
84. See generally TUSHNET, supra note 1, where I argue that our present set 
of fundamental arrangements deserve to be described as a constitutional order 
but acknowledge the cogency of claims that what we are experiencing is an 
extended transitional period. 
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process.85 Mter all, playing for keeps in politics is, it might be 
thought, a recipe for social disaster, leading at the extreme to 
genocide and annihilation of the enemy.B6 Even short of that, 
constitutional hardball might lead to unpleasant personal 
relations among politically active people. And, as L. Michael 
Seidman has emphasized, playing for keeps might be wrong just 
because it fails to acknowledge the possibility that one's political-
constitutional opponents might actually be right about the 
Constitution-a possibility that, according to Seidman, is ever-
present.87 
Note, though, that some of these normative questions are not 
about constitutional hardball in itself, but are about what happens 
when someone wins the game. Consider, for example, the sheer 
distastefulness of constitutional hardball. That problem could be 
eliminated after constitutional transformation occurs-after, that 
is, we emerge from the tunnel into the new constitutional order. 
Then, the politicians having control of the government can revert 
to ordinary constitutional politics, and their opponents can, like 
Eisenhower and Nixon in 1960, play the game on the winners' 
terms, hoping to pick up a victory or two themselves. If our 
normative misgivings are founded in simple distaste for 
constitutional hardball, exacerbated by the fact that politicians 
have been playing it for more than twenty years now, we can take 
solace in the possibility that someday the Republicans might win.88 
The normative problems associated with playing for keeps are 
different. The solutions to those normative problems are usually 
apparent. In its most general form, the solution is for political-
constitutional actors to behave like grown-ups. So, for example, 
the solution to the problem created by the tie vote in the 2000 
presidential election-one that would be obvious in other 
democratic constitutional systems-would have been the 
negotiation of a coalition government, with some agreement, 
perhaps memorialized in a coalition document, about which 
Cabinet offices each party would control, with assurances that, 
85. If not about any particular examples I have used. Again, the problem of 
perspective intervenes. I suspect that people are likely to view what I describe 
as instances of constitutional hardball as entirely sensible legal-political 
strategies when conducted by the side they favor, and as distasteful hardball 
only when conducted by the other side. 
86. That certainly is the practical implication that the German (and Nazi) 
legal theorist Carl Schmitt drew from his analysis of politics as combat 
between enemies. 
87. LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN, OUR UNSE'ITLED CONSTITUTION (2001). 
88. Or, less likely, that Republicans come to accept the fact-if it is one-
that their prospects of complete victory are slim, and so come to accept the 
small victories and small losses that I argue elsewhere are characteristic of 
the present constitutional order (which should not be understood as an 
extended period of transition). 
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taken as a whole, the portfolios of the Democrats and Republicans 
would be roughly equivalent in social and political importance. 
Similarly, the mature solution to the problem of polarizing judicial 
nominations followed by filibusters is an agreement by the 
president not to submit nominations about which a substantial 
number of Senators have deep reservations, coupled with an 
agreement by Senators to confirm all nominees who clear this 
vetting process.89 
The problem, then, does not lie in identifYing outcomes that 
avoid the perils of constitutional hardball. Rather, it lies in 
reaching those outcomes through the ordinary means of politics. 
Several inadequate possibilities deserve mention. 
First, we could simply hope that, once the systemic 
phenomenon of constitutional hardball is identified and named, 
political actors will decide not to play the game. They will give up 
the aspiration to achieve total victory over their opponents. This 
is a possibility I have identified elsewhere as nattering by 
constitutional theorists-identifYing normatively attractive 
solutions to real problems and hoping that their sheer normative 
attractiveness will induce political actors to adopt them.90 As my 
label for the hope suggests, this does not seem to me a promising 
strategy. 
Second, we could hope that political actors will in fact be 
sufficiently mature to adopt the obvious solutions. In Madison's 
terms, we could hope that our political leaders would be 
"enlightened statesmen."91 But, as Madison immediately observed, 
"enlightened statesmen will not always be at the helm."92 And, our 
contemporary circumstances suggest that enlightened statesmen 
might never be at the helm. The reason lies in the structure of our 
present party system.93 For structural reasons that system 
produces highly partisan and ideologically polarized political 
leaders. SimplifYing a complex reality: each party selects its 
89. Reaching such an agreement would require each side to forgo making 
strong claims about the constitutional prerogatives of the president (to 
nominate whoever he deems fit for office) and the Senate (to refuse to confirm 
nominees on whatever grounds a sufficient number of Senators deem 
appropriate). For an interesting example of a failed compromise over the 
composition of the federal judiciary, see Gillman, supra note 30, at 8-9 
(describing attempts by Republican Attorney General Herbert Brownell to 
achieve a compromise with Senate Democrats over increasing the number of 
federal judges and allocating appointments by party). 
90. MARK TuSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 
155 (1999). "A lot of scholarly writing about the Supreme Court. .. seems to 
assume that if academics and journalists natter at the justices long enough, 
they will wake up and see the light we are offering them." Id. 
91. THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison). 
92. Id. 
93. Madison of course did not anticipate the emergence of nationally 
organized parties, much less the particular party system we have today. 
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candidates in a party primary in which the voters are drawn from 
the party's more ideologically extreme wing. Elections then pit a 
quite conservative Republican against a quite liberal Democrat. 
In the aggregate, we end up with a House of Representatives and a 
Senate in which there is, for all practical purposes, no center. The 
partisans we elect are then inclined to play constitutional 
hardball-or, at least, are unlikely to be enlightened statesmen in 
the required sense. 
Third, we might hope that political actors will realize that the 
worm will turn someday. That is, they might correctly believe that 
by playing constitutional hardball today they may be able to take 
control of all the levers of governing power, but they might realize 
that someday their opponents will seize the opportunity to play 
constitutional hardball in return, gain power, and shut them out of 
power. The problem here is with the time-horizon of political 
actors. They will not care if the worm turns after their politically 
active lives are over-after they die, retire, or assume the role of 
elder statesman or -woman. And, if history is a guide, the life 
span of a constitutional order is longer than the time-horizon of 
most active political actors. I would not want to be held to the 
following judgments, but consider the possibility that the 
Jeffersonian-Jacksonian order lasted from around 1801 to 
somewhere in the late 1840s or early 1850s, that the post-
Reconstruction order lasted from around 1876 to somewhere in the 
1930s, and that the New Deal-Great Society order lasted from the 
mid-1930s to the mid-1970s. At every point the remaining life 
span of each constitutional order is longer than the time horizon of 
almost every political actor-with the exception of the time when a 
constitutional order is visibly in decay, which is precisely when the 
political opposition will see the advantages of starting to play 
hardball and the dominant party will play hardball to shore up its 
decaying foundations. 
Are there any ways that politics might produce politicians 
who refuse to play constitutional hardball? The answer, I suspect, 
lies in breaking out of the confines of conventional politics. The 
dynamics I have described occur because the two major parties are 
ideologically polarized. One institutional solution would be the 
creation of a third party, an energized center.94 Because the 
emergence of such a party seems extremely unlikely,95 I suspect 
94. For a moment, it seemed as if the Reform Party might play such a role. 
Jesse Ventura's decision to refrain from running for re-election (with the 
possibility of a later campaign for the presidency) seems to have eliminated 
that possibility. 
95. The Supreme Court's decision in Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New 
Party, 520 U.S. 351 (1997), eliminated one promising method by which such a 
third party might have emerged. And, more generally, the Court's decisions 
on political parties have increasingly endorsed the two-party system, 
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that we are going to experience constitutional hardball until the 
Republican party establishes its dominance in all branches, or 
until its leaders realize that they are not likely to do so in the 
foreseeable future. 
justifying state laws that protect the duopoly. For a discussion, see Samuel 
Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan Lockups of the 
Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643 (1998). 
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